An example of an effective grass roots approach to peaceful hydropolitics

When we speak of transboundary waters we tend to focus at the large top-down scale, partly because of the enormous scale of international basins. However, in my opinion work at the grass roots must go hand in hand with top down efforts in order to lead to successful hydropolitics. As part of ORASECOM the OSR Awareness Kit was created which provides a knowledge base aimed at stakeholders from ordinary people to government departments. It aims to integrate and share knowledge across the basin, a positive step in connecting scales.

However, this post focuses on a more practical initiative outside the basin called ‘Excellent Development’. It works solely at the grassroots building sand dams in Kenya that provide a year round supply of water in seasonal environments storing only 1% of downstream flow. The dams capture and store water from seasonal riverbeds beneath the sand (video and fig.1) storing 2-20 million litres of water[1].

Figure 1: Sand Dam Diagram.

Figure 2: Aljazeera video on sand dam construction in rural Kenya. 

Source: [2]

The water is protected under the sand from waterborne disease and evapotranspiration (average ET loss for Africa = 70-90% of precipitation)[3]. The dams create a microclimate in the hottest and driest parts of Kenya (video and fig.1) by replenishing groundwater aquifers allowing for vegetation to grow and for farmers to plant trees[4].

Figure 2: Picture showing dam, terraces and trees growing in new microclimate.

Source: [5]

The new trees avert erosion of topsoils, preventing loss of fertile soils and up to 50% of water to runoff. Excellent Development see the main aims of sand dams as to ‘alleviate conflicts’ that arise from unpredictable or reduced volumes (or increased pressures) on water supplies in arid regions[6]. Such a scheme could work with similar success in the Orange riparians rural populations producing firm resilience to and prevention against climate change in the basin where effects will be particularly harsh.

Top-down management is also necessary because of the scale of transboundary waters themselves, such as through basin level and regional treaties. However the power of the people at the grass roots to find cheap, ingenious and effective solutions to the water stress that leads to unstable hydropolitics, should never be underestimated.

An opinion: private v public.

Exploring land grabbing highlights some broader concerns around the most peaceful way to manage complex shared water systems, or even water more generally. That is the debate between public and private control of water supplies. Private companies are involved to some extent in all water management, fixing and maintaining supplies are normally the task of private companies. However, referring again to land grabbing, here land and rights are sold to the highest bidder, the land is sold but the water is also quietly given away to support such land. Sharing water involves all stakeholders, yet private companies are often not held accountable for their actions, and few regulations to act as checks and balances exist in countries desperate for foreign investment, where regulation exists, created by international institutions, that ensures a free market operates only on one side of the board.

Private companies are driven by private interest – profit is essential. Water is a public good, or should be, yet across the world is more and more so a commodity to be traded between those who can afford it, just like the food water gives life too. There is a strong argument for some private scope in Africa where governments themselves are unable to borrow sufficiently to develop water sources in necessary ways. However, there is a need for strong regulation of such companies and a commitment to ensuring fair and equitable use. Free water (as initiated in South Africa as a strategy to move away from apartheid divisions in access) is not always viable and arguably does not encourage sustainable use. A sloped fee charges differently for increased use, something that one might see as deterring large investment, or instead encouraging sustainable use of water sources by such investors. The privatisation of water in Bolivia led to revolt that ended the idea, and such action can happen again. To take away water is to take away food, and both are integral to life. To remove this through land grabbing will not end peacefully, as governments like Namibia are starting to see. Private investment that has a bound commitment to said country and is not left to its own self serving devices may have a place in the world as we know it. However, to let companies and countries come in, lease land and provide little else but perhaps destruction of said land, is an unfortunate reality that should be able to be mitigated against. This could occur realistically through working as a unified ‘block’ – such as an agreement between SADC countries to only lease or sell land if there are firm commitments to meet a % of food production for the region, secure employment domestically and to ensure environmental sustainability. This overlooks issues with the actual act of displacement which most would find as fundamentally wrong with such acquisition of land and water. Ideally communities should be strengthened, if this is deemed possible through private lease then it may be fitting, however if people are displaced to their own detriment then large private interests should never be taken first. 

Land grabbing means water grabbing.

Land grabbing is also water grabbing  - to have productive land one needs water and so ‘land… is only a small part of the land grab equation’[1]. The process of ‘grabbing’ is the buying or leasing of land (induced by the food price crisis) in the Global South by foreign governments or private investors on which to apparently grow food to prevent food scarcity. The grabs cause evictions reminiscent of those during the LHWP. Further, in reality cash crops and biofuels are also grown – the former probably inaccessible as food to those who are hungry, the latter inedible – the process does not benefit the poor countries whose land it removes and destroys[2]. For example in Mali sugar production for biofuels is estimated to ‘reduce … irrigable farmland for national food production by 100,000 ha’ [3]. ‘Hydro-hegemon’[4] of the Senqu Riparians, South Africa, is actually accountable for 4% of global land grabs, and signed a deal in 2010 to ‘grab’ 10 million ha of land in SADC member and water abundant country, DRC[5]. This is a loop around VWT whereby instead of promoting trade for DRC to South Africa, South Africa merely buys or leases its land – perhaps the only option because of political instability.

However, if the Chinese example of investment in Namibia for export only tobacco [6]is anything to go by, these grabs often do not actually aim to produce food for those most in need, but rather create profit for companies in high-value markets. Namibia are currently considering banning sales of farmland land to foreign investors, recognising the negative effects of such deals in the long run[7]. The point this post tries to make then, is that it is not only riparians that will impact transboundary waters, but also these invisible, unaccountable private investors that are especially vigilant in the recent world of land grabbing . Provost asks whether ‘future water conflicts will be triggered by the downstream effect of today’s land grabs in Africa?’ [8]and I presume the answer to some extent will be yes. Profit-driven companies catering to foreign markets, with no obligations to the host country do not have the same need to prevent destruction and conflict over waters. This neo-colonial exploitation of vulnerable and complex water reserves should trigger great cause for concern when thinking about the hydropolitics of transboundary waters. 

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[1] C. Provost, ‘Africa’s great ‘water grab’’, in The Guardian, 24^th November 2011, viewed on 12^th January 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/24/africa-water-grab-land-rights.

[2] T. Kachika, Land Grabbing in Africa, Oxfam: London, 2010, p. 31.

[3] T. Kachika, p. 30.

[4] A. R. Turton and N. Funke, p. 51.

[5] K. Sharife, ‘South African-Congo Land Grab: Exploitation or Salvation’, Farmland Grab, 12^th March 2010, viewed on 12^th January 2016, http://farmlandgrab.org/11672.

[6] N/A, ‘Youth activists condemn land given to Chinese company’, Farmland Grab, 10^th March 2015, viewed 12^th January 2016, http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/24654-chinese-investment-in-namibia-grows-to-us-4-6bn.

[7] Kaira, C. ‘Namibia plans to ban foreigners from owning agricultural land’, Farmland Grab, 9^th July 2015, viewed on 12^th January 2016, http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/25114.

[8] C. Provost.

Transboundary aquifers

 Another alternative to unsustainable diversion projects lies in responsible exploitation of groundwater. Taylor et al’s novel work maps groundwater storage estimates for Africa, estimating supplies 100* that of surface water[1]. Yet such stores are emitted from freshwater estimates despite potential to act as a ‘buffer’ for growing food insecurity[2]. Northern Africa alone is found to have  substantial borehole yield potential. However, the Orange riparians have aquifer potential supportive of small-scale irrigation of - 0.5–5 l s ^-1. , important in strengthening community level food security.

Similarly to surface waters, aquifers can be transboundary - between them the Orange riparians share five aquifers (figure 1). Figures 2- 4 explore the potential of the aquifers for the orange riparians. Likewise to transboundary surface waters, there exists guidance for sharing aquifers in the ‘Law of Transboundary Aquifers’.

Figure 1: Transboundary aquifers between the Senqu basin riparians.*

Figure 2: Groundwater potential of Orange basin riparians.

Lesotho ≈ 100* its annual renewable freshwater (RFW) in total groundwater storage (TGS).

Namibia ≈ 1000*.

South Africa ≈ 100*.

Botswana ≈ over 1000*.

Figure 3: Aquifer productivity and approximate depth to groundwater (DTG) (A) (top).

(A) shows predominantly low DTG with some in a deeper band across Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Maximum DTG is 100m meaning affordable access cost suited to small-scale irrigation.

(B) shows moderate – low aquifer productivity for all riparians. 

Figure 4: Aquifer productivity in different geological environments.

Most common underlying geology is consolidated sedimentary rock allowing intermediate borehole yield (0.5–5 l s ^-1 ). Botswanas groundwater potential is greatest; beneficial as it’s main irrigation occurs away from the Senqu.

One may presume that because of the transboundary situation of some aquifers, there is potential for conflict between riparians. However, Cobbing et al’s study of South Africa’s transboundary aquifers states that preconceived notions that aquifers that are not managed holistically will be exploited to the detriment of another state are largely misplaced in this context [1]. With reference to four of the five transboundary aquifers below, Cobbing et al find that aquifer transmissivity is low and regional meaning that ‘transboundary impacts of groundwater abstraction are likely to be very small’[2]. Whilst highly transmissive aquifers need strong cooperative management, this study shows the need to recognise the heterogeneity of aquifers and necessary management. Conflict over transboundary aquifers for the Senqu riparians is very unlikely, however if exploited sustainably the rich underground water source can provide smaller scale security in what is likely to become an even more unpredictable water future.