So is there virtuallly no right answer?

So, after a rather sombre rant about the ‘successful’ sharing of the transboundary Senqu, let us ask…  what are the alternatives? How else can we meet, and even reduce water use in water scarce countries like South Africa?

Many would argue the answer lies in Virtual Water Trading (VWT), where high water intensity products are imported from water abundant countries, and in turn water stressed regions produce less water intensive commodities (fig.1). 

Figure 1: Water footprint of various food products. 

To be clear, ‘virtual water’ is ‘the amount of water consumed in the production process of a product’ (Allan, 1993) and is similar to the more widely used ‘water footprint’ (Hoekstra, 2002). Allen (1996) exemplifies how VWT can be valuable for water-strapped countries, calculating that the Middle East import virtual water (through grain) equivalent to the flow of the Nile!! The South African Development Community (SADC) has advocated such a tactic in order to aid water scarce member nations.

The Orange Basin riparians, or ‘the central belt of scarcity’ (Turton, 1998) (minus Lesotho, for which there is no data and which has a relatively wet climate) are all big virtual water importers, Botswana exports 16% of its water but imports 61% (Lange and Hassan, 2006). Namibia imports a similar 63% but exports 23% due to its production and trade to the EU of beef. South Africa, who pledged $8 billion to the LHWP are the 27^th biggest global importer of virtual water (Hoekstra and Hung, 2002), yet they import only 12% of their water whilst exporting double that. So why not logically change production to meet food, water and trade needs rather than spend billions on diverting this ‘blue gold’? The next post will look specifically at barriers and possibilities in implementing this concept, and explore the pro’s and con’s of its actuality. In a way it seems too good to be true, so lets find out…

It’s a dam shame…

Figure 1: Senqu (Orange) River Basin map. 

This blog will now focus primarily on the Senqu (Orange) River Basin, the longest flowing in Africa, which rises in the Drakensberg Mountains in Lesotho. It then flows through central South Africa, southern Botswana and the southern flanks of Namibia and drains into the Atlantic in South Africa (fig. 1).

This post is going to explore the aforementioned Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), a treaty signed in 1986 between South Africa and Lesotho. It approved the building of five dams and the diversion of 40% of the Senqu to arid South Africa’s Vaal River system in its industrial heartland province, Gauteng. It has been commended by the UNEP as an example of cooperative hydropolitics (UNEP, 2002: 6). The HEP produced is promised to provide 100% of Lesotho’s power needs, whilst revenues from water exports will give the impoverished country a means to develop. Currently revenues from South Africa comprise 75% of Lesotho’s annual budget (International River, 2005).

It is one of the world’s largest infrastructure projects and will cost $8 billion, a price funded by South Africa and the World Bank amongst others. Thus far the 180m high Katse, and 145m high Mohale dam are complete (fig.2).   Figure 2: Katse Dam (top) and Mohale Dam (bottom).   

On paper then, this is an example of non-conflictual use of transboundary waters. However, hailing it successful in these terms overlooks the issues created by the project. Downstream flow and quality has declined, negatively affecting drinking water, fishing and agriculture for 150,000 people (The Guardian, 23.01.08). No environmental impact assessment was conducted prior to construction so uncertainty exists about impacts on biodiversity, however dams are known to block fish and other animal migratory paths and negatively alter ecosystems in reservoirs created. 27,400 people have been displaced and compensation schemes have proved elusive. Only 9% of Lesotho’s land is considered arable and already what is considered the best has been flooded (International Rivers, 2005). The project has also meant rising water costs for Lesothians and South Africans and hasn’t addressed inequalities in water access within countries (International Waters, 2005). Moreover, the 20,000 (mainly male) migrant workers led to increased prostitution and widespread AIDS, Lesotho now has the 3^rd highest prevalence rate in Africa (UNAIDS, 2015). The icing on the cake then is that an estimated 50% of diverted water is lost through poor infrastructure before reaching South Africa (International Rivers, 2005), a hard thing to justify to the 27,000 kicked off their land to allow it to happen.

So, can we call this a conflict free resolution? Here it seems not, as I don't think anyone would describe the above issues as ‘peaceful’ for those affected. Peace should not only be considered in terms of absence of violence, this is too narrow a lense through which to study hydropolitics. This agreement to share water has uneven consequences within and between Lesotho and South Africa, and the clause that no one should be made poorer as result of the project has, unsurprisingly, failed. Agreeing to share then, isn’t quite as dam simple as it seems.

Citations. 

Treat me to a treaty?

Hello again! This week I’m focusing on the legal frameworks and treaties for shared surface waters (I will come to aquifers another time) that Wolf claims are key to hydropolitical peace. (1999: 3). Importantly this ‘soft law’ isn’t legally binding, so the assumption should not be made that treaty = peace. However, opening a discursive commons for negotiation (often) holds out a hand to resolution, for cooperation is not harmony, but is rather an active attempt to prevent potential or current conflict (cited in Goulden, 2009: 806). The figure below shows the distribution of what world transboundary water treaties are focused on. This potential for conflict is predicted to rise in Africa, where the biggest effects of population growth and climate change on already scare waters will be felt simultaneously, putting tremendous strain on the continent least equipped to cope.

Source: Human Development Report 2006.
Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water
crisis. Chapter 6. UNDP, 2006

So what is in place to mitigate bust-ups over this precious liquid? Internationally there is the UN 1997 ‘Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses’. Wolf notes the inherent difficulties in developing guidelines for allocations of a resource that ‘is mobile, fluctuates in time and space, and ignores political boundaries’ (1999:4). Such difficulties result in vague advice in the convention, although Wolf notes that this is expected as there can be no ‘one size fits all’ for the vastly different hydrological and socio-cultural landscapes of shared waters. The convention is not legally binding and only 8 transboundary water disputes have been heard at the International Court of Justice. It advocates ‘reasonable and equitable use’ that ‘does not cause significant harm’ to other riparians, and encourages treaties between basins to address the specificities of transboundary waters. 

One such treaty exists in the ‘Zambezi Watercourse Commission’ (ZAMCOM) established and ratified by 7/8 member states of the South African Development Community in whose territory the Zambezi basin lies. Its main aim is poverty reduction through the shared resource. Similarly to Wolfs findings in wider treaties ZAMCOM favours downstream riparians and existing uses. He finds in 49 treaties studied that all favour needs based claims to water allocation rather than ‘rights’ centred claims more commonly discussed. Compensation and ‘trades’ are common in most treaties, often trading water for HEP, such as in The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Wolf, 1999:13).

But why this sudden switch to thinking about needs? Wolf states that the explanation is simple – needs are quantifiable and rights aren’t, how do you decide whose rights are well… right?  Certainly thinking about needs is easier, but allocation of needs can be influenced by uneven power and resource distribution. If I’ve got more arable land than you, the money to irrigate it and infrastructure to support markets for my produce, am I entitled to more water simply because some coloniser portioned themselves a more ‘valuable’ chunk of the continent? It is a question I will leave you with, alongside this call from Wolf (1999: 15) to encourage treaty negotiations for all 261 international basins:

“Despite the inherent difficulties, treaties are not only the best representation of local needs and settings, but they also carry the highest priority in international law. By encouraging local negotiations, global political issues could also be better avoided.”

Citations.

Goulden, M., Conway, D. and A. Perschino. (2009). ‘Adaptation to climate change in international rivers basins in Africa., Hydrological Sciences Journal, 54(5), 805-828.

Wolf, A.T. (1999) ‘Criteria for equitable allocations- the heart of international water conflict.’,  Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-15.

'The hydropolitics of transboundary waters': what does this mean and what does it mean for Africa?

As a first post, it seems logical to simply introduce the mouthful that is ‘the hydropolitics of transboundary waters’ and situate this in Africa, mainly as a way of actually introducing myself to a topic I know little about. Africa is the poorest inhabited continent on earth (IMF, 2011) with wealth disparities within and between its 54 countries. Further disparities exist in access to water, the physically drier North having 92% water coverage (UN, 2014) whilst Sub-Saharan Africa has 300m living in a water scare environment (NEPAD, 2006), where the average supply of water per person <1000m3 p/y (Falkenmark et al, 1989). Figure 1 shows projections for water stress in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2025, although there are issues associated with this measurement (see Taylor, 2004.) Importantly scarcity shouldn’t always be read as lack of fresh water, as often it rather signifies socio-economic and political barriers in accessing available sources - such as potential conflict of use over shared waters.  

Figure 1: Predicted water scarcity by 2025, UN. 

                             

                                                                                                                       











                                                                                                                        Figure 2: Map of the Nile. 

Africa has 59 waters that are transboundary (excluding shared aquifers) with the Nile being shared between eleven countries (fig.2). Unfortunately for some, often downstream riparian’s, the lucky countries upstream don’t have to play particularly nice. If they go by ‘territorial sovereignty’ then in their eyes, they have absolute rights to waters in their territory. Since upstream riparian’s essentially get first dibs on the water source, they can dam, divert, overuse or pollute, negatively affecting the amount and quality of water that flows downstream. Claims to historical rights of use however prove stronger than one might. However, whether those upstream can dam etc. depends on capability to access water, which is where ‘physical, economic and social disparities between riparian river basins’ make management even more complex (UNEP, 2002: vii ). The volatile condition of sharing a resource that for many African countries is scarce, and a resource that is, lets not forget, vital to life, has led to predictions of water wars over this ‘blue gold’.

However, the UNEP (2002) states that we should celebrate the cooperation and riverine integrity approach that is common in international, regional and basin-level treaties managing transboundary waters. I am cautious of some of the African examples it hails commendable, such as the Lesotho Highland Water Project, but this, alongside a deeper look into the legalities of transboundary waters is for another time. This post has simply intended to introduce what I am beginning to realise is the difficult and important reality of hydropolitics in nation plagued by economic water scarcity, that is going to have to be able to share nicely.

Citations:

Falkenmark, L. (1989) ‘The massive water scarcity threatening Africa-why isn't it being addressed?’ Ambio, 18, 2, 112-118.

 Taylor, R.G., 2004. 'Water Resources and development challenges in eastern and southern Africa'. In: T. Bowyer-Bower and D. Potts (Eds.), East and Southern Africa . Regional Development Text, RGS-IBG Developing Areas Research Group, Addison-Wesley Longman (London), Chapter 7, pp. 198-228.

UNEP (2002) Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, Nairobi: UNEP.