So is there virtuallly no right answer?

So, after a rather sombre rant about the ‘successful’ sharing of the transboundary Senqu, let us ask…  what are the alternatives? How else can we meet, and even reduce water use in water scarce countries like South Africa?

Many would argue the answer lies in Virtual Water Trading (VWT), where high water intensity products are imported from water abundant countries, and in turn water stressed regions produce less water intensive commodities (fig.1). 

Figure 1: Water footprint of various food products. 

To be clear, ‘virtual water’ is ‘the amount of water consumed in the production process of a product’ (Allan, 1993) and is similar to the more widely used ‘water footprint’ (Hoekstra, 2002). Allen (1996) exemplifies how VWT can be valuable for water-strapped countries, calculating that the Middle East import virtual water (through grain) equivalent to the flow of the Nile!! The South African Development Community (SADC) has advocated such a tactic in order to aid water scarce member nations.

The Orange Basin riparians, or ‘the central belt of scarcity’ (Turton, 1998) (minus Lesotho, for which there is no data and which has a relatively wet climate) are all big virtual water importers, Botswana exports 16% of its water but imports 61% (Lange and Hassan, 2006). Namibia imports a similar 63% but exports 23% due to its production and trade to the EU of beef. South Africa, who pledged $8 billion to the LHWP are the 27^th biggest global importer of virtual water (Hoekstra and Hung, 2002), yet they import only 12% of their water whilst exporting double that. So why not logically change production to meet food, water and trade needs rather than spend billions on diverting this ‘blue gold’? The next post will look specifically at barriers and possibilities in implementing this concept, and explore the pro’s and con’s of its actuality. In a way it seems too good to be true, so lets find out…

It’s a dam shame…

Figure 1: Senqu (Orange) River Basin map. 

This blog will now focus primarily on the Senqu (Orange) River Basin, the longest flowing in Africa, which rises in the Drakensberg Mountains in Lesotho. It then flows through central South Africa, southern Botswana and the southern flanks of Namibia and drains into the Atlantic in South Africa (fig. 1).

This post is going to explore the aforementioned Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), a treaty signed in 1986 between South Africa and Lesotho. It approved the building of five dams and the diversion of 40% of the Senqu to arid South Africa’s Vaal River system in its industrial heartland province, Gauteng. It has been commended by the UNEP as an example of cooperative hydropolitics (UNEP, 2002: 6). The HEP produced is promised to provide 100% of Lesotho’s power needs, whilst revenues from water exports will give the impoverished country a means to develop. Currently revenues from South Africa comprise 75% of Lesotho’s annual budget (International River, 2005).

It is one of the world’s largest infrastructure projects and will cost $8 billion, a price funded by South Africa and the World Bank amongst others. Thus far the 180m high Katse, and 145m high Mohale dam are complete (fig.2).   Figure 2: Katse Dam (top) and Mohale Dam (bottom).   

On paper then, this is an example of non-conflictual use of transboundary waters. However, hailing it successful in these terms overlooks the issues created by the project. Downstream flow and quality has declined, negatively affecting drinking water, fishing and agriculture for 150,000 people (The Guardian, 23.01.08). No environmental impact assessment was conducted prior to construction so uncertainty exists about impacts on biodiversity, however dams are known to block fish and other animal migratory paths and negatively alter ecosystems in reservoirs created. 27,400 people have been displaced and compensation schemes have proved elusive. Only 9% of Lesotho’s land is considered arable and already what is considered the best has been flooded (International Rivers, 2005). The project has also meant rising water costs for Lesothians and South Africans and hasn’t addressed inequalities in water access within countries (International Waters, 2005). Moreover, the 20,000 (mainly male) migrant workers led to increased prostitution and widespread AIDS, Lesotho now has the 3^rd highest prevalence rate in Africa (UNAIDS, 2015). The icing on the cake then is that an estimated 50% of diverted water is lost through poor infrastructure before reaching South Africa (International Rivers, 2005), a hard thing to justify to the 27,000 kicked off their land to allow it to happen.

So, can we call this a conflict free resolution? Here it seems not, as I don't think anyone would describe the above issues as ‘peaceful’ for those affected. Peace should not only be considered in terms of absence of violence, this is too narrow a lense through which to study hydropolitics. This agreement to share water has uneven consequences within and between Lesotho and South Africa, and the clause that no one should be made poorer as result of the project has, unsurprisingly, failed. Agreeing to share then, isn’t quite as dam simple as it seems.

Citations.