Land grabbing means water grabbing.

Land grabbing is also water grabbing  - to have productive land one needs water and so ‘land… is only a small part of the land grab equation’[1]. The process of ‘grabbing’ is the buying or leasing of land (induced by the food price crisis) in the Global South by foreign governments or private investors on which to apparently grow food to prevent food scarcity. The grabs cause evictions reminiscent of those during the LHWP. Further, in reality cash crops and biofuels are also grown – the former probably inaccessible as food to those who are hungry, the latter inedible – the process does not benefit the poor countries whose land it removes and destroys[2]. For example in Mali sugar production for biofuels is estimated to ‘reduce … irrigable farmland for national food production by 100,000 ha’ [3]. ‘Hydro-hegemon’[4] of the Senqu Riparians, South Africa, is actually accountable for 4% of global land grabs, and signed a deal in 2010 to ‘grab’ 10 million ha of land in SADC member and water abundant country, DRC[5]. This is a loop around VWT whereby instead of promoting trade for DRC to South Africa, South Africa merely buys or leases its land – perhaps the only option because of political instability.

However, if the Chinese example of investment in Namibia for export only tobacco [6]is anything to go by, these grabs often do not actually aim to produce food for those most in need, but rather create profit for companies in high-value markets. Namibia are currently considering banning sales of farmland land to foreign investors, recognising the negative effects of such deals in the long run[7]. The point this post tries to make then, is that it is not only riparians that will impact transboundary waters, but also these invisible, unaccountable private investors that are especially vigilant in the recent world of land grabbing . Provost asks whether ‘future water conflicts will be triggered by the downstream effect of today’s land grabs in Africa?’ [8]and I presume the answer to some extent will be yes. Profit-driven companies catering to foreign markets, with no obligations to the host country do not have the same need to prevent destruction and conflict over waters. This neo-colonial exploitation of vulnerable and complex water reserves should trigger great cause for concern when thinking about the hydropolitics of transboundary waters. 

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[1] C. Provost, ‘Africa’s great ‘water grab’’, in The Guardian, 24^th November 2011, viewed on 12^th January 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/24/africa-water-grab-land-rights.

[2] T. Kachika, Land Grabbing in Africa, Oxfam: London, 2010, p. 31.

[3] T. Kachika, p. 30.

[4] A. R. Turton and N. Funke, p. 51.

[5] K. Sharife, ‘South African-Congo Land Grab: Exploitation or Salvation’, Farmland Grab, 12^th March 2010, viewed on 12^th January 2016, http://farmlandgrab.org/11672.

[6] N/A, ‘Youth activists condemn land given to Chinese company’, Farmland Grab, 10^th March 2015, viewed 12^th January 2016, http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/24654-chinese-investment-in-namibia-grows-to-us-4-6bn.

[7] Kaira, C. ‘Namibia plans to ban foreigners from owning agricultural land’, Farmland Grab, 9^th July 2015, viewed on 12^th January 2016, http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/25114.

[8] C. Provost.